The latest Iranian reporting indicates that Tehran and Muscat are negotiating a genuinely new, jointly agreed shipping corridor—not merely restoring the traditional arrangement under which inbound traffic uses the Iranian side and outbound traffic the Omani side.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei says technical and political discussions are progressing positively. Iran and Oman have exchanged navigational maps and are consulting maritime and security specialists. The immediate objective is a temporary arrangement for safe inbound and outbound shipping, with a permanent management system apparently to follow. Baghaei stressed, however, that agreement on a route would not automatically mean Iran had agreed to reopen the Strait generally.
Iran rejects proposals that fail to prioritise its security concerns following the unprovoked attacks by the United States and Israel. Tehran therefore refuses to recognise an independently operated southern Omani corridor and insists that any eventual arrangement preserve effective Iranian security oversight.
Oman, meanwhile, is understandably hesitant to make itself a target of the United States. President Trump recently warned that Oman had better “behave just like everybody else, or we’ll have to blow them up,” adding: “We’ll watch over it, but nobody’s going to control it.”
Meanwhile, several attacks occurred in the Red Sea, indicating that Ansarullah is determined to be part of the emerging regional security architecture. Ansarullah has endured a decades-long conflict, including an illegal Saudi-led war and blockade, as well as Israeli attacks—most notably the devastating strike on Hudaydah port in 2024.
The following is an analysis of several hypothetical scenarios concerning the Strait of Hormuz. It should be noted that Israel's invasion of Lebanon is not included in this analysis, although it remains an important consideration in any lasting regional peace agreement.
The first scenario assumes that Iran's security regulation of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz is largely symbolic, generating little revenue through transit security regulations. Iran may calculate that, provided its own crude oil exports are no longer blockaded, this option would maximize export revenue and strengthen its strategic position.
The weakness of this analysis is that one of the principal purposes of war reparations is to establish deterrence. Even if Iranian shipping is normalized, what would prevent the United States and Israel from repeating the same cycle every few years, imposing costs on Iran currently estimated at around US$400 billion? Such a pattern would effectively amount to a prolonged, Syrian-style economic attrition of the Iranian people. For this reason, the prospect of Iran adopting a purely symbolic security architecture in the Strait of Hormuz appears unlikely.
The second scenario is that Iran maintains the current toll- or fee-based framework beyond the initial stages of developing the new security architecture. The difficulty with this scenario is that it would likely be politically unacceptable for the United States, particularly in the lead-up to the midterm elections. As a result, it is the scenario most likely to prolong the conflict, with the future of the Strait ultimately being determined by force rather than negotiation, one way or the other.
The third, and preferred, scenario is the establishment of a security architecture that satisfies Iran's security requirements while also meeting its objective of deterrence through a form of war reparations, but is framed in a manner that is politically acceptable to the Trump administration. Trump appears to be seeking an off-ramp from further escalation, and the type of security architecture Iran is pursuing could potentially provide one if it is presented in a politically palatable way. The issue, therefore, may be less the substance of the arrangement than the way it is framed and communicated to domestic and international audiences.
The third scenario would involve establishing an independent regional security agency to assess each cargo transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The agency would charge a security assessment fee of up to 1% of the cargo's value. The revenue would be managed through the Chinese international financial system, with proceeds distributed to Iran and other Persian Gulf states as compensation for war-related damages. Each state would receive a share of the revenue proportional to the damages it sustained. For example, if Iran accounted for 90% of the total assessed damages and Qatar 5%, then Iran would receive 90% of the revenue and Qatar 5%.
Initially, Western governments would likely argue that the independent Persian Gulf Security Agency is not genuinely independent. However, as the architecture matures, particularly in the context of a prolonged energy crisis, this issue could become less politically significant through institutional refinement, transparency and broader regional participation.
An additional feature of this approach is that it enables Iran and its proposed security architecture to leverage the emerging multipolar international order, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. Academics such as John Mearsheimer have argued that, while the United States has suffered little reduction in its hard power during the conflict, it has incurred substantial losses in soft power. Iran could seek to convert those shifts into tangible strategic advantages by encouraging a new political and commercial order across Asia. China would be well positioned, if it continues to signal defensive realism and confidence-building measures, to expand economic and security normalization with countries such as Japan, Taiwan and Australia. It is not unreasonable to argue that such a regional environment could also improve the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, with developments involving Iran forming one of several contributing strategic variables.
Western governments and commercial institutions operate through legal, financial and administrative frameworks that place considerable importance on procedural legitimacy. The Enhanced Security Assessment Certificate (ESAC) architecture is intended to provide that additional layer of legal and commercial legitimacy. If Iran maintains a strategy of defensive realism while incorporating this institutional framework into its broader security architecture, it could strengthen its ability to engage the middle powers of the Asia-Pacific and have a greater influence in the multipolar world order.
